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OpinionGlossary
Cognitive control: cognitive mechanisms responsible for guiding thought and
behaviour in accordance with current goals and intentions.
Conscious: here we use the term in the sense of access consciousness [1]. A
representation is access conscious just in case it can be used, without further
processing, for verbal report, inferential reasoning, storage in episodic and
semantic memory, and by other ‘consuming’ systems.
Metacognition: use of metacognitive representations (often, but not exclu-
sively, for purposes of cognitive control).
Metacognitive information: information about a property of a cognitive
process, for example, the variance in the firing rate of a population of neurons
in visual cortex. Information is just a matter of correlation, strong or weak, and
need not be used or represented.
Metacognitive representation: a representation of a property of a cognitive
process, for example, the reliability of a perceptual representation. Metacog-
nitive information that is represented and used for cognitive control is thereby
a metacognitive representation, for example, the variance in the firing rate of a
population of neurons in visual cortex can form the basis of a representation of
the probability that the perceptual representation is correct (cf. object level
representation).
Object level representation: a representation that is not at the meta-level, that
is, that does not concern cognitive processes as such. Examples include
representations of the nature, location, or value of a stimulus. (Similarly,
correlates of such properties, whether represented or not, carry ‘object level
information’.)The human mind is extraordinary in its ability not merely
to respond to events as they unfold but also to adapt its
own operation in pursuit of its agenda. This ‘cognitive
control’ can be achieved through simple interactions
among sensorimotor processes, and through interac-
tions in which one sensorimotor process represents a
property of another in an implicit, unconscious way. So
why does the human mind also represent properties of
cognitive processes in an explicit way, enabling us to
think and say ‘I’m sure’ or ‘I’m doubtful’? We suggest
that ‘system 2 metacognition’ is for supra-personal cog-
nitive control. It allows metacognitive information to be
broadcast, and thereby to coordinate the sensorimotor
systems of two or more agents involved in a shared task.
A novel framework for metacognition research
Converging theoretical and empirical research suggests
that most animals implicitly represent properties of their
cognitive processes and use these for cognitive control (see
Glossary [1–3]) [4–6]. This challenges the view that only
humans have metacognition [7], which is broadly defined
as ‘cognition about cognition’, and raises the question why
humans, unlike other animals, not only implicitly but also
explicitly represent properties of their cognitive processes.
In this opinion article, we propose a ‘dual systems’
framework for thinking about metacognition. In our frame-
work, metacognition is composed of a cognitively ‘lean’
system, system 1 metacognition, which operates implicitly
and is for the control of processes within one agent (intra-
personal cognitive control), and a cognitively ‘rich’ system,
system 2 metacognition, which is likely to be unique to
humans and is for the control of processes within multiple
agents (supra-personal cognitive control). Whereas the
former system is found in many animals, the latter system
is likely to be unique to humans. Our ‘lean’ account of
metacognition clarifies the minimal requirements for1364-6613     
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Open access under CC BY license.metacognition and thereby offers a conceptual anchor in
a literature where there are many conflicting assumptions
about what counts as metacognition. Further, our ‘rich’
account of metacognition addresses why humans evolved
the ability to explicitly represent properties of their cog-
nitive processes: by sharing and discussing these repre-
sentations, agents can engage in novel forms of adaptive
group behaviour and build cumulative culture.
Metacognition and its relation to cognitive control
The broad definition of metacognition as ‘cognition about
cognition’ is often interpreted widely ([8], p. 170), to include
any cognitive process that receives information from and
has a controlling influence on another cognitive process
[9,10]. So-construed, metacognition would encompassSystem 1 (type 1 cognitive processes): a label for a number of cognitive
systems that operate autonomously and do not require working memory. A
system 1 process is typically fast, automatic, associative, effortless, and non-
conscious. System 1 processes tend not to cause or suffer much interference
when combined with one another or the performance of other tasks [2,3].
System 2: a label for a cognitive system that relies on working memory and is
typically slower, serial, rule-based, more effortful, and conscious. Because of
its limited capacity, processes relying on system 2 tend to disrupt each other
[2,3].
Box 1. Metacognition in humans
Metacognition can be assessed with a range of different paradigms.
Perceived (in)correctness of a first-order decision is often measured
retrospectively through explicit second-order confidence or error
detection judgements [58,59]. Moreover, post-decision wagering
requires participants to place a wager on a just made decision,
assuming higher bets will follow from higher confidence [60].
Another measure often used in reward paradigms is opt-out or
uncertainty response, which allow the participant to skip a response,
obtaining a smaller but guaranteed reward [61]. All these judge-
ments are diagnostic of task performance, meaning higher con-
fidence on correct compared with error trials. This leads to the
question as to what metacognitive information is being represented
by system 1 and system 2 metacognition. Studies have identified a
range of candidates, which can be divided into two classes: directly
accessed and inferred [39,62].
Direct access models assume that metacognition is based on the
same information as the decision itself or some property of the
decision. There are cases of direct access system 1 metacognitive
representations that are based on exactly the same information as
the decision. For example, Gigerenzer and colleagues suggested
that both decision making and confidence are based on the validity
of an activated cue [63]. A similar assumption is made by type 2
signal detection theory [64]; in this class of direct access models,
confidence corresponds to the quantity of decision evidence
accumulated for one response option. Other properties of the
decision evidence have been suggested to play a role, such as its
quality. Both Peirce’s model of confidence [65] and Kiani and
Shadlen [4] suggest a combination of both [58,59]. The idea that
external variability affects confidence has also been suggested [59],
meaning that more variable stimuli lead to lower levels of
confidence. Others have suggested cognitive conflict as a basis for
metacognition [13,17], which is based on the idea of competing
response tendencies. The evidence in favour of the unchosen choice
option also plays a role in mismatch models, which assume that
metacognition is based on an internal matching process of the
intended action with the actually performed one [66,67], as well as
prediction errors [46]. Similarly, the balance-of-evidence hypothesis
is another example of direct access models, according to which,
confidence is a function of the evidence for the chosen and the
unchosen option [68].
In contrast to direct access models, inferential models assume
that metacognition is based on information external to the first-
order decision-making process. For example, an individual may
learn that information from conflicting or variable sources of
evidence leads to slower responses [69], and thus infer her
confidence from response times, either approximated internally
[70,71] or through the observation of one’s own or another
individual’s response movement. Several other inferential models,
rooted in the metamemory literature, assume that metacognition is
based on ease of processing, that is how accessible a representation
is [72], how fluently it can be processed [73], or how familiar it is
[74]. Another inferential hypothesis is the self-consistency model
(SCM [39,75]), based on the consensuality principle, which assumes
participants have implicit knowledge of what response others would
give and approximate their confidence accordingly.
Box 2. Metacognition in non-human animals
There is compelling evidence that non-human animals are more
likely to seek additional information [76,77], to opt out of making
decisions [4,5,78–80], and to make lower post-decision wagers
[67,81] under conditions in which a human observer would describe
them as uncertain; for example, when the animal is required to
make a difficult rather than an easy visual discrimination, or to
remember an event over a long rather than a short interval. Some
recent studies of monkeys [67], rats [5,78], and pigeons [79] have
also indicated, using transfer tests and single neuron recording, that
this type of metacognitive behaviour can be regulated by internal
rather than external cues; for example, that it covaries more
precisely with neural signals from the orbitofrontal cortex or the
supplementary eye fields than with external stimulus values.
These data suggest that animals from a wide range of species are
capable of system 1 metacognition. As we have characterised it,
system 1 metacognition is undemanding (see subsection ‘Only
some forms of cognitive control involve metacognition’ above). It
could be mediated by simple reinforcement learning (cf. [7,82]).
However, the current data do not show that animals are capable of
system 2 metacognition: that they are able to infer or to learn, using
system 2, the metacognitive significance of system 1 cues. Even in
the most compelling experiments (e.g., [60,78]), it is possible that a
‘high confidence’ internal system 1 signal, X, automatically
triggered reward-seeking behaviour – and thereby reduced the
probability of information-seeking, opt-out, and low post-decision
wagers – without the animal having to use a system 2 process to
learn that, in the presence of X, reward-seeking behaviour tends to
be successful.
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more narrowly, as control processes that make use of one or
more metacognitive representations, that is, representa-
tions of a property of a cognitive process (Boxes 1 and 2).
For example, a perceptual process may use the mean
firing rate of a population of neurons in visual cortex to
represent a perceived property such as the length of a line.
Crucially, the variance of the firing rate across the popula-
tion indicates the extent to which the neurons ‘agree’ about
the line length and thus carries information about the
reliability of the perceptual representation (metacognitive
information) [11]. We propose that, if the latter type ofinformation is used to control the relative influence of the
perceptual representation on cognition [12], then it counts
as a metacognitive representation, and the use of this
representation for cognitive control should be considered
to be an instance of metacognition. As well as choosing
which sensorimotor dispositions are allowed to drive beha-
viour, metacognition thus conceived can be involved in
distributing resources between rival processes [13], in
emotion regulation [14], in guiding memory retrieval [9],
allocating study time [9], and so on.
Only some forms of cognitive control involve
metacognition
Although all metacognition is a form of cognitive control,
only some forms of cognitive control are metacognitive.
Cognitive control need not make use of metacognitive
representations and can be guided instead by object level
representations, for example, of value or of abstract goals
[15,16]. By contrast, other control processes do make use of
metacognitive representations, for example, they repre-
sent that mutually inconsistent actions have been acti-
vated, which prompts the use of cognitive control processes
in response selection [10,17].
Thus, our first conclusion is that, if metacognition is
defined carefully, metacognition does not encompass every
type of cognitive control. What, then, is distinctive about
metacognition, beyond its defining feature – the use of
metacognitive representations? One possibility is that
metacognition is only found in the cognitive control pro-
cesses carried out by higher executive systems. In consid-
ering this possibility and suggesting an alternative, we
make use of the well-known distinction between system 1
and system 2 [3]. However, our proposal does not depend on
the details of dual systems theory, and it is consistent with187
Opinion Trends in Cognitive Sciences April 2014, Vol. 18, No. 4other theories of higher-level executive function [18–20].
The dual-systems model draws on evidence that there is a
distinctive form of cognitive processing, type 2 processing
or system 2, with respect to which various functional
features tend to cluster together, underpinned by their
reliance on a capacity-limited generalised working mem-
ory system [2,3,21]. System 2 handles problems serially,
takes time to operate and is affected by general working
memory load. Its effectiveness correlates with individual
differences in measures of general intelligence. By con-
trast, system 1 processes can act quickly, with many
operating autonomously in parallel, and are little affected
by general working memory load. System 2 representa-
tions are characteristically explicit, that is, conscious,
whereas system 1 representations need not be.
Are metacognitive processes simply those control pro-
cesses that are carried out by system 2? Unfortunately,
things do not fall out so neatly. Much cognitive control takes
place outside system 2 [22,23]. For example, experimental
subjects can inhibit responses to stimuli of which they
remain unaware due to visual masking [22] and slow down
after errors they do not know they have made [24]. These
system 1 types of control can make use of metacognitive
representations such as decision uncertainty [25,26], for
example, as evident in a neuropsychological patient whose
behaviour shows adaptation to the prevailing difficulty of
the task even though she has no conscious experience of
mental effort [25]. Non-human animals are similarly cap-
able of using metacognitive information [27] (Box 2). That,
however, leaves us with a pressing puzzle. If system 1
metacognition is so pervasive, in humans and other animals,
what role is there for system 2 metacognition?Sensory
input
System 1 
Perceptual
system
Figure 1. System 1 metacognition with a single agent. The control of cognitive process
Contention scheduling, a term introduced by Norman and Shallice [18], refers to a mec
system requirements. Metacognitive representations reflect the properties of the functio
improve control. An example of such representations would be the reliability of sensor
weight [12].
188A hypothesis about the distinctive function of system 2
metacognition
Our answer to the puzzle – what is the role of system 2
metacognition? – will be that it comes into its own when the
action-driving systems to be controlled are found in two
different agents: that is, in cases of ‘supra-personal cogni-
tive control’.
Within a single agent, domain-general processes of
learning, which are part of system 1, can quickly establish
– through experience – the best way to prioritise the inputs
to and outputs from competing sensorimotor systems
(Figure 1). Such processes can use system 1 metacognitive
information – for example, variance of a distribution, time
to completion of a process, activation of incompatible
response tendencies (Box 1) – to improve those trade-offs,
just as they can learn to use any other type of relevant cue.
The result will be a form of control that is implemented
within system 1 processing and relies on metacognitive
representations – that is, a system 1 form of metacognition.
When sensorimotor systems have to be coordinated
between two or more interacting agents it is no longer
possible for learning automatically to make use of all and
any metacognitive information located anywhere within the
different agents: my system 1 learning processes have direct
access to the metacognitive information in my head, but not
to the metacognitive information in your head, and vice
versa. Some forms of coordinated action do not depend on
metacognitive representations, for example, bodily move-
ments can be synchronised relying only on object level
information (e.g., about the location and trajectory of limbs)
[28,29]. But inter-agent control will typically be more
effective when it can use metacognitive representations, ifAcon
Eﬀector
system 
Contenon
scheduling
Metacognive
representaons
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es in an individual’s system 1 occurs automatically and at a sub-personal level [3].
hanism for resolving competition between processes that overlap in their effector
ning of these cognitive processes. System 1 uses metacognitive representations to
y signals. Cognitive processes estimated to be more reliable can be given greater
Sys tem 1 Sys tem 1 
Sys tem 2 Sys tem 2 
Action Action 
Communication of system 2
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Figure 2. System 2 metacognition for cognitive control across two agents. System 2 metacognitive representations are derived from information in system 1, but they are in
a form available for verbal report. For example, the reliability of a sensory signal can be reported in terms of confidence. When agents are cooperating, these reports can be
used to optimise control by, for example, giving more weight to the more confident observer [32]. Via system 2, verbal reports can also have long-term effects on the
functioning of system 1 [57].
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processes in each agent are selected for broadcast to the
other agent, so that decisions about which sensorimotor
processes to deploy can be taken in a space of shared
metacognitive information. This, we suggest, is the distinc-
tive role of system 2 metacognition: to select metacognitive
information for broadcast, in the service of controlling the
sensorimotor systems of two or more agents involved in a
shared task – that is, for supra-personal cognitive control
(Figure 2).
Ours is different from the hypothesis that metacogni-
tion is for mentalising –that is, perceiving or inferring
other people’s mental states [30,31]. The first difference
is that the representations concern one’s own cognitive
processes in the first instance, rather than those of
another. The second difference is that communicating
metacognitive representations plays a central role. To
caricature: the mentalising story says that metacognition
is there to allow agent A to infer that agent B has seen a
rabbit; according to us, system 2 metacognition is there to
allow agent A to communicate that his visuomotor fix on
the rabbit is pretty reliable at present.
How system 2 metacognition works
System 2 metacognition plays a central role in group
decision making
According to our hypothesis, system 2 metacognition
should play a central role in group decision making. Indeed
we find that joint perceptual decision making is signifi-
cantly more effective when participants communicate
metacognitive representations about the stimuli [32,33].
When deciding whether to trust witness testimony, (mock)
jurors make considerable use of a witness’s confidence and
other metacognitive representations (e.g., calibration of
confidence and accuracy) [34]. People also communicatemetacognitive representations when they are synchroni-
cally coordinating complex actions (e.g., communications
about confidence used in team sports) [35,36]. System 2
metacognition can also be used diachronically, for example,
making it possible for people to discuss how metacognitive
representations should be deployed, affecting their own
cognitive control [37]. Control strategies based on meta-
cognitive representations, for example, what to do when
memory fails, can be the subject of explicit instruction. For
example, a person can learn socially that, following failure
to produce items in a verbal fluency task to name animals,
a good strategy is to consider subcategories of animals
(farm animals, pets, etc.) [38].
Three types of work done by system 2 metacognition
We can distinguish three different types of work done by
system 2 metacognition. First (W1), it makes metacogni-
tive representations available for verbal report and hence
for communication. Second (W2), system 2 metacognition
works out the significance of metacognitive representa-
tions that have been broadcast or selected for communica-
tion, that is, what the individual or group should do (e.g.,
try harder, start again, give low weighting to that person’s
opinion) when a metacognitive representation has a cer-
tain range of values (e.g., indicates disfluency or lack of
confidence). Although system 1 processes already contain
some metacognitive representations which system 2 meta-
cognition can select to make available (‘direct access’ [39]),
a third type of work done by system 2 metacognition (W3) is
to construct or infer metacognitive representations from
multiple sources of (sometimes weak) metacognitive infor-
mation (Box 1, Figure 2).
In addition, we can, as mentioned above, distinguish
between synchronic and diachronic supra-personal cogni-
tive control. In cases of synchronic coordinated agency,189
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performance of two or more people when working on the
same task at the same time. Metacognitive representations
can also be used diachronically in teaching other agents
how to think and act in the future, to improve subsequent
performance in coordinated action [40], and possibly also in
solitary tasks [41]. The interpretation of metacognitive
representations, and what to do about them, can be altered
through discussion with others, enabling the generation of
cultural consensus and regulation concerning what the
cues mean and why some instructions are more appropri-
ate than others. For example, using system 2 metacogni-
tion, groups develop and pass on theories about system 1
processes (about how to think) [37]. Learnt reliance on
shared metacognitive representations can be effective even
though people can be very unreliable in reporting some of
the object level information used by system 1 processes.
For example, people are wildly incorrect about the object
level information used by the system 1 processes involved
in catching a ball, but can still share metacognitive infor-
mation to facilitate joint performance [35,42].
When is system 2 metacognition direct and when is it
inferred (W3)? We suppose that direct access will be used
where the information is available, for example, confidence
in perceptual decision making; and inferred otherwise, for
example, in predictive ease of learning judgements [9,43]
(Box 1). If direct, there should be a reasonably tight corre-
lation between the subject’s reports (e.g., of accuracy) and
objective measures [44,45]. If system 2 has to infer the
metacognitive significance of system 1 cues there is more
room for error.
Examples and limitations of system 2 metacognition
One central source of metacognitive representations is the
prediction errors generated and used by many system 1
processes to guide learning [46]. When relied on to guide
learning and behaviour prediction errors can represent
the reliability of another of the system’s representations
(e.g., of the value of an option) and lead that representation
to be revised for the future [47]. Large prediction errors
may produce feelings of perceptual disfluency [48] or
action selection disfluency [49]. System 2 can learn the
significance of these feelings and use them for cognitive
control.
System 2 has limited processing capacity, thus it can
only make use of a limited number of metacognitive
representations. That number should decrease as other
demands on general working memory increase. And
indeed there is some evidence that under cognitive load
subjects switch from relying on several raw cues to
depending on a single summary [50]. An example of such
a summary is the z-score (derived from the mean and the
standard deviation of the internal perceptual representa-
tion) communicated by subjects in social psychophysics
experiments [32], although it is not known whether sub-
jects could have communicated the raw cues indepen-
dently. In some cases, the raw cues on which
summaries are based may no longer be available. How-
ever, this mandatory fusion occurs relatively late in devel-
opment (12 years [51]), suggesting that adults could
learn to unpack the summary if necessary.190The function of system 2 metacognition
The functional claim about system 2 metacognition
comes in various strengths
We have suggested that system 2 metacognition is for
supra-personal cognitive control. The functional claim –
what system 2 metacognition is ‘for’ – comes in several
strengths. A modest claim is that system 2 metacognition
is functionally involved in cases of inter-agent cognitive
control; in situations where two or more people successfully
coordinate their actions to achieve an outcome that
depends on sensorimotor processes found in both. A bolder
hypothesis is that this is the evolutionary purpose of
system 2 metacognition: that the ability to represent
metacognitive information in system 2 evolved to allow
people to engage in more sophisticated cooperative projects
and coordination tasks.
The hypothesis that system 2 metacognition evolved for
supra-personal cognitive control
There is not scope here to properly assess the evolutionary
claim, but we will note an empirical consequence. Humans
are a distinctively cooperative mammal, engaging in coor-
dinated behaviour to an extent that is markedly different
from even our closest primate cousins [52,53]. If the ability
to use system 2 to select, construct, and broadcast meta-
cognitive representations arose in humans in response to
selection pressure for increasingly complex forms of coor-
dinated action, then in non-human animals we would not
expect to find a system 2 that processes metacognitive
representations (Box 2). One possibility is that non-human
animals do not have a system 2 at all. Alternatively, non-
human animals may have system 2 functions, such as
maintenance in working memory and selective attention
[54,55], that do not involve the use of metacognitive infor-
mation. In this case, what evolved in the hominin line was
the capacity to take metacognitive representations in sys-
tem 1 and turn them into metacognitive representations
for system 2.
According to this evolutionary hypothesis, supra-perso-
nal coordination was the origin of system 2 metacognition.
Using conscious metacognitive representations to control
one’s own individual behaviour is probably the most
obvious manifestation of system 2 metacognition in every-
day life. But on our account, using metacognitive repre-
sentations about one’s own cognitive processes for intra-
personal cognitive control came second, and arose as a side
effect of the selection of system 2 metacognition for inter-
personally coordinated action. The picture is of cooperation
becoming a central feature of the human way of life, in the
form of fluidly coordinated joint action and diachronically
organised cooperative projects, both controlled by a supra-
personal system of cognitive control. This system directs
resources and activity between a variety of different sen-
sorimotor processes that are distributed across agents. It
relies on selected metacognitive representations which,
because they are shared among the agents involved, enable
more efficient and complex forms of coordinated action.
The selection and sharing occurs not only synchronically,
while a particular episode of coordinated action is in pro-
gress, but also diachronically, as system 2 metacognition
allows experts to teach novices how to use metacognitive
Box 3. Outstanding questions
 Is there a specific format for system 2 metacognitive representa-
tions designed to enable a common supra-personal metric (e.g.,
confidence as signal mean*precision)?
 Can cognitive control be improved through inter-personal ex-
change of system 2 metacognitive representations?
 Can the interpretation of system 2 metacognitive representations
be changed/corrected through discussion (e.g., learning that
perceptual fluency indicates familiarity)?
 What are the distinctive features of group decision making in
humans in comparison to eusocial animals such as ants and bees?
 Are there cultural differences in the use of system 2 metacognitive
representations?
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tary tasks.
The selection processes favouring the emergence of
system 2 metacognition could have been genetic and/or
cultural. To the extent that the evolutionary processes
were genetic, rather than cultural, one would expect: (i)
little cross-cultural variation in the extent and content of
system 2 metacognition, especially when people are
tested in coordinated action tasks and when adults are
teaching children; and (ii) that metacognitive compe-
tence would emerge early and independently of instruc-
tion. If these predictions are false [56], it would suggest a
role for cultural selection in the evolution of system 2
metacognition (see section on ‘Empirical predictions’
below).
An (even) more radical evolutionary hypothesis about
system 2 metacognition
The evolutionary claim about the function of system 2
metacognition in turn comes in various strengths. So far,
we have suggested that it was the ability to represent
metacognitive information in system 2 that was selected.
This allows that early hominins may already have had
system 2 in place, and perhaps also natural language
(which may or may not be separable from the presence of
system 2). However, it is worth noting that a much more
radical evolutionary claim could also be entertained: that
system 2 itself evolved to perform the function of select-
ing, constructing, and broadcasting metacognitive repre-
sentations in the service of supra-personal cognitive
control. A yet further evolutionary question on which
we do not venture to speculate is the relation of these
various evolutionary steps to the emergence of conscious-
ness.
Empirical predictions
We suggest several empirical predictions against which
our hypothesis can be tested. The first concerns linguistic
communication. It follows from our functional hypothesis
that some forms of joint action are significantly aided by
communication of metacognitive representations selected
by system 2 metacognition. Thus, in a novel task requiring
two or more agents to act jointly in pursuit of some goal
(i.e., not one where an action plan has been automatised in
system 1 processes in both agents), blocking the linguistic
communication of metacognitive information should have
a selective detrimental effect on performance, in a way that
blocking the linguistic communication of object level infor-
mation about the task does not.
Similarly, in such a novel coordination task, cognitive
load should selectively impair performance, and should do
so via an effect on the (accuracy or range) of communicated
metacognitive information. By contrast, where automatic/
autonomous/implicit processes rely on metacognitive infor-
mation in directing behaviour or resources between sen-
sorimotor processes, increased cognitive load should cause
relatively little impairment.
A third prediction concerns individual differences. Per-
formance in the types of novel coordination tasks just
described should correlate with individual differences in
measures of general intelligence.Our final prediction concerns non-human animals.
If, contrary to our hypothesis, non-human animals have
system 2 metacognition, they should be able to learn that
reward-seeking behaviour is successful after making deci-
sions that are unlikely to be correct (low confidence) and
unsuccessful after making decisions that are likely to be
correct (high confidence). This could be tested by, for
example, using a reverse transfer test after training in a
wagering task.
Concluding remarks
As yet the evidence for our hypothesis is limited and
there are many outstanding questions (Box 3). The two
key components, for which there is some preliminary
evidence, are: (i) that system 2 metacognition is very
malleable and readily influenced by instructions and
beliefs [56,57]; and (ii) that exchange of system 2 meta-
cognitive representations can create advantages for the
group [32]. If tests of our empirical predictions provide
further support, it would suggest that metacognition is a
specific form of cognitive control and is not unique to
system 2. Metacognitive information such as decision
uncertainty is used to modulate ongoing thought and
behaviour in the absence of awareness. These implicit
metacognitive representations enable the many different
processes that make up system 1 to work together in an
optimal manner. However, when metacognitive repre-
sentations are explicit in system 2 they can be readily
used to enable several people to work together in an
optimal manner, for example, by sharing information
about decision confidence. We suggest that explicit meta-
cognitive representations exist for this reason. This role
is possible, first because the representations are in ver-
bal form suitable for sharing, and second because they
can modify the functioning of system 1. On the basis of
metacognitive signals emerging from system 1, accounts
are developed in system 2 designed to explain and con-
trol the functioning of system 1. These accounts can be
sketchy and inaccurate, like any narrative, but are con-
stantly updated and sometimes improved through dis-
cussion with others. This process provides a mechanism
for modification of behaviour through instructions
and cultural expectations. These are powerful forces
that alter behaviour of whole groups of people and
provide a mechanism for the emergence of cumulative
culture.191
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